

LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY COORDINATING COUNCIL

Action Plan to Reduce Youth and Gang Violence: *Ensuring Effective Coordination, Oversight, Community Engagement & Measurable Outcomes*

Draft proposal for the Executive Committee, September, 2012

After a year of deliberations and a review of the many efforts in Multnomah County to reduce and prevent youth and gang violence, LPSCC's Youth & Gang Violence Steering Committee has concluded that LPSCC should be more actively engaged in the oversight and coordination of these efforts. As a result, the Steering Committee proposes this Action Plan to Reduce Youth and Gang Violence.

LPSCC has a critical role to play in Multnomah County's violence reduction strategies by providing effective coordination and oversight and by supporting community engagement in the development and implementation of these strategies. Due to LPSCC's effectiveness, widespread acceptance and longevity, the Council can also ensure a sustainable process to promote long-term, balanced strategies that many jurisdictions across the country, despite short-term successes, have been unable to maintain.

In January 2011, LPSCC's Executive Committee adopted an earlier version of an Action Plan to Reduce Youth and Gang Violence, which contained some of the actions proposed in this plan. Based on the experience of the Steering Committee thus far, its understanding of evidence-based and promising practices in the field and its vision of a more coordinated and aligned approach to reducing youth and gang violence in our community, the Steering Committee requests the Executive Committee's approval of the following proposed actions that make up this Action Plan:

1. Through the Steering Committee, coordinate and link current youth and gang violence strategies to align policy and practice within Multnomah County and among jurisdictions.

LPSCC's primary function is to coordinate the development and implementation of public safety policies and strategies in Multnomah County. The Council has performed this function in large part by establishing committees and working groups made up of participating agencies and organizations and affected stakeholders and communities.

The effectiveness of Multnomah County's youth and gang violence reduction strategies across the county will be greatly enhanced by charging the Steering Committee with the responsibility of linking and coordinating the implementation of these strategies.

2. Support the use of evidence-based and promising practices to seek a systems level, balanced approach of strategies and actions among suppression, intervention, prevention and re-entry.

Although emphasis on each of the strategies may be different at any given point in time, the Steering Committee will maintain a commitment to engage in efforts each of the four approaches to reducing youth and gang violence.

3. To support and raise up community voice on the issues of gang and youth violence - including that of young people and their families involved in gang and youth violence.

As part of its previous efforts to address youth and gang violence, LPSCC has emphasized the importance of actively engaging communities directly affected by youth and gang violence in the processes of identifying of the communities' problems, needs and assets and of overseeing the development and implementation of evidence-based strategies. The Steering Committee's responsibilities should include the establishment of the means to engage affected communities in those processes.

4. To build shared, integrated, and common investment, values, principles, goals, messaging and measurable outcomes for all youth and gang violence reductions strategies in Multnomah County.
5. Establish a regular schedule for the Youth and Gang Violence Steering Committee to report to LPSCC's Executive Committee.

To ensure that the Executive Committee carries out LPSCC's oversight and coordination responsibilities effectively and that the process of developing and implementing violence reduction strategies becomes sustainable, the Executive Committee should establish a regular schedule for the Steering Committee to report to the Committee. While the Steering Committee will no doubt determine the content of many, if not most, of its regular reports, members of the Executive Committee should feel free to request reports on specific subjects of interest or

concern and on recent developments involving youth and gang violence.

Conclusion

If LPSCC's Executive Committee chooses to assume a more active role in coordinating and overseeing strategies to reduced youth and gang violence in Multnomah County, it should expect the following benefits:

1. Greater coordination of operations, programs and services among participating justice agencies, community organizations and local governments in Multnomah County and, in particular, between operations in West and East County;
2. The opportunity for line staff and managers of the participating agencies and organizations across the county to keep elected leaders and policymakers informed of ongoing youth and gang violence reduction strategies so those officials can provide leadership, budgetary support and policy guidance to ensure a sustainable intergovernmental structure to support the strategies; and
3. Greater confidence of elected officials in current evidence-based strategies and operations.

Youth Gang Violence Steering Committee 6/25/12

Initiatives currently underway in prevention, intervention and suppression to accomplish gang ceasefire

GVTF – Gang Violence Task Force: Lead City of Portland office of youth violence prevention, meets every other week to share information and discuss GVRT investigations, community members, county and city non profit partners. Engaging community in discussions related to ongoing public and private efforts to stop the violence. Gang outreach workers under the guidance of OYVP connect gang members to prosocial options and services.

GVRT – Gang Violence Response Team: Lead PPB criminal investigations on identified gang involved violent incidents. *(as of June responded to 59 gang related violence calls in the city up from 47 in 2011 and 40 in 2010. There have been 57 gang related shootings as of June 2012 up from 36 in same period in 2011)* **TOD** – Tactical Operations Division, **GET** Gang Enforcement Team lead PPB: collaborations on high risk gang violence suppression tactics like hotspot enforcement in geographic areas or events with high violence indicators and criminal investigations. **GTF** Gun Task Force

MGET – Metro Gang Task Force “Safe Streets” FBI, PPB, GPD, Hillsboro PD, Beaverton PD, Milwaukie PD, Vancouver PD FUSION Center share intel and coordinate apprehension of violent gang member offenders.

CRT – Crisis Response Team Lead: PPB Marci Jackson. Coalition of trained volunteer community partners called by police and medical personnel to provide immediate support to victims, their families and loved ones following a traumatic violent incident. After a gang shooting, or other violent incident, mobilizes resources to provide outreach to families and community in effort to deescalate tensions and prevent retaliatory violence.

Restore the Village –Lead DCJ, Sam Thompson local business owner and community leader, series of community engagement forums to discuss the current violence. Collaborators Sun Schools of Multnomah County, Portland's Office of Youth Violence Prevention, Boys and Girls Club, New Columbia's Homeowners Association, Portland's Housing Authority, Cascadia Behavioral Healthcare, and the Portland Police Bureau. (no longer in place 0912)

Stop the Violence – DCJ, PPB, US Attorney, DDA , community members, meeting with identified gang members to engage them in the conversation and to explain and promise the consequences of failure to end the violence.

Multnomah Youth Commission – youth violence summit, forum for youth to voice their experiences, hopes and ideas

School Districts: initiatives to address drop out, truancy and discipline policies, restorative justice initiatives.

GIFT – Lead by PPB McGranahan (now Lt Art Nakamura) DDA Rod Underhill, LPSCC Matt O’Keefe, DCJ Erika Preuitt Selection of top 20 identified active gang involved families for wrap around services.

GRRP – Gang Rapid Response Project – County Health Dept, DCJ, MCHS, Juvenile Detention, PPB,

CHI – Community Healing Initiative- Lead DCJ and DCHS, juvenile court counselors working with their high risk black and latino juveniles and their families and community providers using eco mapping as an intervention strategy.

Social Network Mapping Collaborative – LPSCC Matt O’Keefe, partner agencies, PPB, GPD, MCSO, DCJ, DA, to map the violence by incident and participants to inform efforts of partner agencies.

1145 – non profit organized by community churches in gang affected community, volunteers, 1 time a week, volunteer for 45 minutes (current members 400+), for 1 year. Provide a visible presence by walking in hotspot areas and parks in an effort to prevent gang violence and show community moral voice opposing violence.

CONNECTED – community volunteers, mostly black men, who walk in Holiday Park and Lloyd Center every Friday night, to reduce potential for gang gatherings and violence.

Misdemeanor Gang Mentor Program - Lead DA Jim Hayden, Judge Nan Waller, Julie Frantz, Jean Maurer, Ken Walker, OYVP, PPB, Community Members, 1145, connecting identified youthful gang misdemeanor offenders with the moral voice of the community, and pro social models and mentors.


Rosewood Initiative – Community building coalition. 162nd/Stark 15 block area designated to increase community capacity and engagement to address public safety concerns including gang violence. Lead: Board of Directors of residents, community building, mcso, ppb, Gresham pd., dcj, county

Accountability Board - OYA reentry initiative connecting reentering OYA youth with the moral voice of the community

STRYVE – CDC grant initiative “Striving to Reduce Youth Violence Everywhere” – Lead Health Department Rebecca Stavenjord and a Community Coalition. Providing education and technical assistance on youth violence prevention efforts.

PSN – Project Safe Neighborhoods DOJ grant. Lead: US Attorney four AUSA focused on gangs and guns prosecutions, Multnomah DDA Eric Zimmerman, focused prosecution of youth gang/gun offenses combined with community education outreach on measure 11 to at risk youth and their families in partnership with El programa hispano.

PPB – Referral Program. Contact kids in the community and make referrals to contractors for services, catholic charities.



- MOU exists between YGVSC and initiatives to define operational relationships, grant requirements, confidentiality of information sharing, etc.
- YGVSC reps sit on decision-making body for each initiative to ensure information sharing, capacity building and sustainability.
- Each initiative develops annual work plan and timeline to be included in larger YGVSC Hub Action Plan
- Relationship with YGVSC Hub is largely information sharing, resource development and system/capacity building for sustainability

DRAFT 6/15/12 prepared for YGVSC

LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY COORDINATING COUNCIL

Action Plan to Reduce Youth and Gang Violence: *Ensuring Effective Coordination, Oversight, Community Engagement & Measurable Outcomes*

Adopted by the Executive Committee, January, 2011

In September 2008, LPSCC's Executive Committee adopted a nationally-recognized, comprehensive approach to reducing youth and gang violence. The approach recognizes the equal importance of enforcement, intervention and prevention strategies in reducing youth and gang violence, as well as the need for close coordination among the local governments and agencies responsible for implementing these strategies and the active engagement of communities most affected by youth and gang violence.¹

LPSCC has a critical role to play in Multnomah County's violence reduction strategies by providing effective coordination and oversight and by supporting community engagement in the development and implementation of these strategies. Due to LPSCC's effectiveness, widespread acceptance and longevity, the Council can also ensure a sustainable process to promote long-term, balanced strategies that many jurisdictions across the country, despite short-term successes, have been unable to maintain. And, in light of LPSCC's commitment to data-driven policymaking and evidence-based policies and practices, the Council can assure the development of outcome measures that track the county's progress in reducing youth and gang violence.

LPSCC's Executive Committee has discussed the active role it played in overseeing and coordinating gang and gang violence strategies in the late 1990s as part of a Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (STACS) in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice, Portland's Youth Gun Action Team (YGAT) and other agencies, organizations and communities throughout Multnomah County. The Executive Committee has also recognized that, in recent years, LPSCC has not continued to fully perform this critical role. As a result, LPSCC's staff was asked to develop this Proposed Action Plan for the Committee's consideration at its November 2, 2010 meeting. The following

¹ A copy of the Executive Committee's statement of this approach, "A Proposal for a Comprehensive and Coordinated Response to Gang and Youth Violence," is attached.

proposed actions are based upon the Executive Committee's attached statement of its comprehensive approach to reducing youth and gang violence in Multnomah County, as well as LPSCC's prior experience overseeing the STACS Initiative.

Seven Proposed Actions

1. Establish a new Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence to ensure the coordination of current violence reduction strategies and the development of new evidence-based strategies.

LPSCC's primary function is to coordinate the development and implementation of public safety policies and strategies in Multnomah County. The Council has performed this function in part by establishing an organizational structure of working groups made up of participating agencies and organizations and affected stakeholders and communities.

The effectiveness of Multnomah County's youth and gang violence reduction strategies across the county will be greatly enhanced by a working group charged with the responsibility of coordinating the implementation of these strategies and the development of new ones. The working group should include representatives of the agencies, organizations and communities involved in or affected by these strategies. To ensure its responsiveness and effectiveness, the working group should be limited to 15 members, and will report to the Executive Committee on a regular basis as determined by the Committee.

The Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence should carry out its functions in conformity with the Executive Committee's approach set forth in the attached "Proposal for a Comprehensive and Coordinated Response to Gang and Youth Violence."² In light of LPSCC's membership in the National Network for Safe Communities (see <http://www.nnscommunities.org/>), the Working Group should utilize information and data on evidence-based strategies and practices developed through the National Network and share information and data on Multnomah County's experiences with the Network's members.

2. Designate the Director of Portland's Office of Youth Violence Prevention as the Chair of LPSCC's Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence.

Based upon the experiences of over 50 jurisdictions in the National Network for Safe Communities, it is essential to the effectiveness of the Executive Committee's oversight role and the Working Group's coordination functions to

assign a dedicated staff member to lead the Working Group and report regularly to the Executive Committee. To ensure continuation of LPSCC's earlier successes in overseeing and coordinating Multnomah County's youth and gang violence reduction strategies, the original vision for Portland's Office of Youth Violence Prevention was to play a central role in coordinating Multnomah County's ongoing violence reduction efforts on behalf of LPSCC. Therefore, the Director of that Office is the logical choice to lead this current effort.

To provide the Director of the Office of Youth Violence Prevention with sufficient time to lead this effort, the Executive Committee should consider allocating an appropriate amount of funds from LPSCC's budget to relieve the Director of some of his current administrative duties. To promote closer coordination and communication with LPSCC, the Executive Committee should also consider co-locating the Director or his Office with the offices of LPSCC's staff.

3. Support the development of an OJJDP Gang Assessment

In order to qualify for certain federal funding through the US Department of Justice, a local jurisdiction must complete a Community Gang Assessment, which, as specified by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), helps jurisdictions evaluate (a) the level and extent of gang involvement in serious and violent crimes and (b) factors in the community that may be contributing to local youth joining gangs. In addition to satisfying a requirement for federal funding, the assessment would also guide and inform Multnomah County's short-term and long-term response to gang violence.

LPSCC and its partner agencies should conduct this assessment by retaining a consultant to lead the process in Multnomah County. Because a large portion of the data and information needed to write this report are already available, the process should be completed within three months of retaining the consultant.

4. Ensure the active engagement of those communities in Multnomah County directly affected by youth and gang violence.

During its STACS Initiative and as part its stated approach to addressing youth and gang violence,³ LPSCC emphasized the importance of actively engaging communities directly affected by youth and gang violence in the processes of identifying of the communities' problems, needs and assets and of overseeing the development and implementation of evidence-based strategies. In

² See note 1, above.

³ See note 1, above.

September 2008, LPSCC's Executive Committee proposed that representatives of the Coalition of Communities of Color perform this function.

Whichever group or groups are chosen to perform this function now, the choice of the group(s) should be made by or be acceptable to the affected communities. Furthermore, an individual selected by the group(s) should serve on LPSCC's Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence.

5. Require the development and implementation of measurable outcomes for all youth and gang violence reductions strategies in Multnomah County.

LPSCC is committed to data-driven policymaking and evidenced based policies and practices in all of the work it does. Therefore, the Executive Committee should promote the use of measurable outcomes for all the enforcement, intervention and prevention strategies to reduce youth and gang violence in Multnomah County.

While "outputs" like "number of cases" or "number of contacts with youth" may be relevant to operational efficiencies, such measures are not outcome measures that can be used to determine the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of violence reduction strategies. Numbers of shots fired, aggravated assaults and homicides, for example, are the outcome measures that can be used to determine the effectiveness of enforcement and intervention strategies. Recidivism and successful program completion, for example, are outcome measures for determining the effectiveness of intervention and prevention strategies.

A critical step in the development of countywide outcome measures is the establishment of consistent definitions of "gangs," "gang violence," gang-related incidents," "gang-affected youth" and other terms used by affected agencies and organizations throughout the county. Subject to its periodic oversight and input, LPSCC's Executive Committee should delegate the development and implementation of these kinds of outcome measures to the Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence.

6. Establish a regular schedule for the Working Group on Youth and Gang Violence to Report to LPSCC's Executive Committee.

To ensure that LPSCC's Executive Committee continues to carry out its oversight and coordination role effectively and that this process of developing and implementing violence reduction strategies remains sustainable, the Executive

Committee should establish a regular schedule for the Working Group and its Chair to report to the Committee. While the Working Group will no doubt determine the content of many, if not most, of its regular reports, members of the Executive Committee should feel free to request reports on specific subjects of interest or concern and on recent developments involving youth and gang violence.

7. Endorse the following initiatives led by Mayor Adams

At the Executive Committee's October 12, 2010 meeting, Mayor Adam requested the Committee's support of the following actions;

- (a) reestablish Portland's Youth Gang Anti-Violence Team (YGAT), probably with a different name;
- (b) establish a single phone number that gang-involved and gang-affected individuals or their families or supporters can call in order to be matched with services and support; and
- (c) create and enforce exclusionary zones at gang hot spots.

Conclusion

If LPSCC's Executive Committee chooses to resume a more active role in coordinating and overseeing strategies to reduced youth and gang violence throughout Multnomah County, it should result in the following benefits:

1. Greater coordination, if not integration, of operations, programs and services among participating justice agencies, community organizations and local governments in Multnomah County and, in particular, between operations in West and East County;
2. The opportunity for line staff and managers of the affected agencies and organizations across the county to keep elected leaders and policymakers on the Executive Committee informed of ongoing youth and gang violence reduction strategies so those officials, and the colleagues they inform in turn, can provide high-level leadership, budgetary support and policy guidance, which should strengthen and improve these strategies and ensure a sustainable intergovernmental structure to support the strategies; and
3. Confidence of those officials in current evidence-based strategies so, in the face of the kind of tragic events and media attention that have occurred over recent months, they are able to resist the temptation to "reinvent wheels" at the

operational level and, instead, (a) highlight and intensify effective current strategies and (b) perform the proper and critical roles of policymakers described above.

LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY COORDINATING COUNCIL

A PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE AND COORDINATED RESPONSE TO GANG AND YOUTH VIOLENCE

April 2009

Introduction

Over the past several decades, **three strategies have typified local governments' responses to gang and youth violence: suppression, intervention and prevention.** Suppression strategies typically involve specialized police and prosecution gang units that target the illegal behavior of active gangs and gang members with targeted and aggressive law enforcement tactics. Intervention efforts also focus on active gangs and their members, frequently in conjunction with suppression strategies and usually through outreach, corrections and social services. Prevention strategies generally focus on youth, families and communities at risk of becoming involved in gangs (e.g., siblings of active gang members) with programs such as mental health and addiction treatment, education services, and job, life skills and employment training.

A substantial body of rigorous empirical research and practical street-level experience now confirms **what works and what doesn't work** with regard to these three strategies:¹

- Suppression strategies are critical to interrupting cycles of gang violence and retaliation and responding to violent incidents by apprehending and prosecuting perpetrators. However, with the exception of incapacitating violent offenders through lengthy state and federal prison sentences, **suppression strategies alone don't work to significantly reduce gang activity or youth violence over the long run.** To achieve such reductions over time, suppression strategies must be coordinated with intervention strategies like community outreach and correctional supervision and prevention strategies that focus on youth at risk of joining gangs.
- Local efforts to reduce gang and youth violence have frequently been disappointing because they have emphasized **short-term tactics at the expense of long-term strategies** by focusing primarily on the latest neighborhood "hot spots" and gang rivalries, for example, rather than measurable outcomes with statistical significance such as violent crime rates in affected communities measured over substantial periods of time.
- Successful efforts to reduce gang and youth violence adopt **a comprehensive, three-pronged approach that coordinates suppression, intervention and prevention strategies** in pursuit of common, well-defined, long-term goals and outcomes.

¹ See, e.g., the "Selected References" at the end of this proposal.

- The most effective efforts have also incorporated the insights of **public health professionals and epidemiological analysis** in strategic planning and development processes as part of a comprehensive, three pronged approach.
- Efforts to reduce gang and youth violence have been unsuccessful without **the support of affected communities** through their meaningful participation in the design, implementation and evaluation of gang and violence reduction strategies, thereby ensuring that these strategies are culturally appropriate and address problems of real concern to the affected communities.
- Most local efforts to reduce gang and youth violence are unsuccessful in achieving measurable, long-term results due to the lack of **a formal organizational structure**, which ensures
 - a proper balance and coordination among suppression, intervention and prevention strategies,
 - strategies and operations that focus on common goals and outcomes,
 - participating agencies and community organizations are held accountable for achieving common goals and outcomes,
 - meaningful participation by the affected communities and stakeholders and
 - sustainable efforts that persist in addressing gang and youth violence on a long-term basis, rather than tactical responses that are intermittent and temporary.

A Proposal

This proposal is based upon (1) the foregoing empirical research and practical experience, (2) a history of balanced, comprehensive and community-based approaches to public safety by Multnomah County and cities in the County, (3) the many accomplishments of Multnomah County's Local Public Safety Coordinating Council (LPSCC) and (4) the opportunities for coordination and collaboration presented by the co-chairmanship of LPSCC by Portland City Commissioner Dan Saltzman and Multnomah County Chair Ted Wheeler. Accordingly, **efforts to reduce gang and youth violence in Multnomah County should include the following components:**

- **A comprehensive, three-pronged approach** that balances and coordinates suppression, intervention and prevention efforts by city and county agencies in Multnomah County;
- **Policy and planning guidance and oversight of these efforts by LPSCC** through a Working Group established by the Council and made up of representatives of participating agencies, affected communities and key stakeholder organizations;

- **A partnership between LPSCC’s Working Group and the Coalition of Communities of Color** to ensure (a) the support of affected communities, (b) coordination and balance among suppression, intervention and prevention strategies and (c) the development of strategies, polices and operations that are culturally appropriate and that address problems of real concern to those communities;

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LOCAL PUBLIC SAFETY COORDINATING COUNCIL

The Comprehensive Approach to Combating Youth & Gang Violence in Multnomah County

In July of 2009, a wave of seven shootings in as many days startled residents of Multnomah County. Although these tragic incidents occurred throughout the county and are not believed to be related, they do share two important characteristics:

- All of the known suspects and victims were under the age of 25
- Most of the shootings involved disputes between gang members

These tragic incidents involving youth, gangs and guns, coupled with recent police reports that gang membership is increasing throughout our community and in East Multnomah County in particular, might suggest that little has been or is being done to address the problem of youth and gang violence. However, the recent shootings came as a surprise to those who have witnessed the significant progress Multnomah County has made in reducing gang and youth violence.

Moreover, the steady drumbeat of media coverage of violent incidents – especially homicides – has fueled a perception that Multnomah County is a particularly dangerous place to live. Yet the violent crime rate in this region and across the state trails the rates for the rest of the country; and all of these rates have been steadily dropping over the past decade.

In Portland, for example, homicides averaged 47 a year from 1994 to 1997, while cities of similar size experienced homicide rates of 200 or 300. From 1998 through 2000, Portland's average homicide rate dropped to 27. By 2008, there were a total of 24 homicides in Portland; and during the first half of this year, there have been nine.

A History of Combating Youth & Gang Violence

For over a decade local governments, public officials, law enforcement agencies, service providers, community organizations and individual citizens throughout the county have been combining forces to implement coordinated, nationally-recognized strategies to combat youth and gang violence. These strategies, which focus on **enforcement** of the law through concentrated patrols and aggressive prosecution, **intervention** with youth and young adults who are at-risk for or have already committed serious delinquent acts, and **prevention** of risk factors for violence within the community, have already led to impressive results:

- Reports of shots fired in Portland have dropped from 3193 in 1996 to 1609 in 2008.
- Aggravated assaults with a handgun have plummeted in Portland, from 867 in 1994 to 244 in 2000 to a low of 151 in 2007. There were 163 assaults with a handgun in 2008.
- The number of youth referred to the Department of Community Justice for criminal activity has steadily decreased since 2001, even as the population of individuals under 18 grows within Multnomah County.

- In 2006, the most recent year for which the department has data, juvenile recidivism was at its lowest level in six years.

One homicide, one assault or one gang-related shooting is one too many. However, the above statistics suggest that the overall rate of youth and gang-related violence has dropped dramatically in recent years, in part due to growing coordination and collaboration between law enforcement and prevention efforts.

A Comprehensive Approach

Drawing on existing relationships and efforts, local governments, public officials, public safety agencies and community organizations are poised to respond quickly and aggressively to future incidents involving violent youth. With a shared recognition that efforts across the nation to reduce youth and gang violence fail when participants stop working together and return to their organizational “silos,” Multnomah County, Portland, Gresham, the other East County cities, along with their public safety and social service agencies, service providers and community organizations, have renewed their shared commitment to combat youth and gang violence through coordinated law enforcement, social service and prevention strategies.

LPSCC’s Youth and Gang Violence Workgroup

For over 15 years, public safety stakeholders have met monthly as Multnomah County’s Local Public Safety Coordinating Council (LPSCC) to coordinate their public safety policies and operations and to collectively address issues critical to public safety. With Portland City Commissioner Dan Saltzman and County Chair Ted Wheeler serving as co-chairs, and with a Youth and Gang Violence Workgroup chaired by Gresham’s Chief of Police, the Director of the Department of County Human Services and a Program Manager at Self Enhancement, Inc., one of Portland’s leading community-based, youth development organizations, LPSCC has adopted a comprehensive approach to reduce youth and gang violence. This approach recognizes the need to:

1. Plan, coordinate and sustain law enforcement, corrections and youth outreach suppression and intervention strategies and social service, public health and community-based prevention strategies; and
2. Directly engage representatives of affected neighborhoods and communities of color in the development and implementation of those strategies.¹

As its first order of business, the Youth and Gang Violence Workgroup, in partnership with the Coalition of Communities of Color, is focusing on the county’s network of prevention programs and services in order to identify (a) opportunities to maximize the collective impact of existing prevention programs and services through planning, coordination and realignment; (b) critical gaps in those prevention programs and services; (c) evidence-based prevention strategies from other jurisdictions that have proven to reduce youth and gang violence; and (d) methods to coordinate these prevention strategies with ongoing suppression and intervention strategies.

¹ A more detailed description of this approach, including its three principal strategies, entitled “A Proposal for a Comprehensive and Coordinate Response to Gang and Youth Violence,” is attached.

In order to gain further expertise and additional perspectives and resources regarding the factors leading to youth and gang violence, LPSCC and its Youth and Gang Violence Workgroup have forged partnerships with Multnomah County's Juvenile Justice Council, an interagency group that serves functions similar to LPSCC's for the county's juvenile justice system, and the county's Health Department. The Chair of the Juvenile Justice Council, Presiding Juvenile Judge Nan Waller, is a member of both LPSCC and the Workgroup. The Director of the county's Health Department's is a member of LPSCC and the department's epidemiologist and community outreach manager are members of the Workgroup.

Portland's Office of Youth Violence Prevention

The City of Portland has implemented another critical component of this comprehensive and coordinated approach. Under the leadership of Commissioner Saltzman in his role as Police Commissioner, and in collaboration with community and non-profit organizations throughout the City, Portland's Office of Youth Violence Prevention and Police Bureau are employing problem-oriented policing and youth outreach and prevention strategies to combat youth and gang violence, including strategies to (a) develop and maintain a coordinated network of youth and gang outreach workers with city funding support, (b) allow police officers to refer delinquent and at-risk youth to community-based youth prevention and support programs and (c) deliver prevention and education services to gang and crime-affected neighborhoods.

As part of this effort, a Gang Prevention Task Force chaired by Commissioner Saltzman meets regularly with police officers, community members, youth outreach workers, youth service providers and probation and parole officers to identify critical problems and emerging trends throughout the city involving youth and gang violence. A related Gang Violence Coordination Team works directly with the Police Bureau's Gang Unit to coordinate law enforcement strategies with youth outreach and community-based prevention programs.

Moving Toward a Sustainable Approach

This kind of comprehensive approach to reduce youth and gang violence must be coordinated under the auspices of an established intergovernmental organization like LPSCC for such an approach to be sustained and for its impacts to be maximized. However, the programs and services provided by the participating agencies, service providers and community-based organizations are even more essential. Despite steadily decreasing levels of public funding and of the resources that depend on that funding over the past decade, the following three strategies, and the programs and services in furtherance of those strategies, have been critical factors in the county's steadily decreasing levels of violent crime in Multnomah County:

- We **enforce** by establishing specialty gang units that arrest youth and gang members engaged in crime and delinquency; by prosecuting those offenses or delinquent acts, with convictions of the most serious offenses resulting in incarceration or detention; and by returning offenders on probation and parole to

prison, jail or juvenile detention for serious violations of the conditions of their supervision.

- We **intervene** by establishing teams of police officers, probation and parole officers and youth outreach workers to track, monitor and regularly contact high-risk youth and gang members likely to be engaged in crime and violence; by providing a visible presence at potentially violent neighborhood “hot spots” and other community events that pose a high risk for violence and other serious crimes; and by providing high-risk offenders and gang-involved youth with critical programs and services, including alcohol and drug treatment, mental health treatment, behavior training, family outreach and counseling, life skills and job training, education, and employment help.
- We **prevent** through contractual and working relationships between local government partners, such as law enforcement, corrections, social service and public health departments, and community partners, such as non-profit service and treatment providers and community organizations. Using evidenced-based, culturally relevant service delivery models, these relationships allow government and community to provide wraparound services, one-stop service centers and intensive, interdisciplinary case management to individuals and families who may be at risk for later violent behavior. School-based and after school education, training, health and recreation programs represent some of the most powerful prevention tools at our disposal.

Get involved:

LPSCC general meetings are held on the first Tuesday of every month at the Multnomah Building and are open to the public. Contact lpscc.staff@co.multnomah.or.us for more information.

The Office of Youth Violence Prevention meets regularly every other Friday; meetings are open to the public. Contact Rob Ingram for more information.

Learn more about the efforts in Multnomah County:

For a more detailed description of the foregoing programs and services, see the updated editions of LPSCC’s two September 2004 reports entitled “Healthy Communities: A Youth Gang Prevention Strategy for Portland and Multnomah County” and “Healthy Communities: A Youth Gang Prevention Strategy for Gresham and East Multnomah County,” both of which can be found on LPSCC’s website: <http://www.lpscc.org>.

2008 Multnomah County Juvenile Crime Report:
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dcj/jsd_juvenile_crime_trends082808.pdf

Multnomah County Department of Community Justice Gang Information
<http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dcj/gangresources.shtml>

Portland Office of Youth Violence Prevention
<http://www.portlandonline.com/Saltzman/index.cfm?c=49710>



NATIONAL NETWORK FOR SAFE COMMUNITIES

PRACTITIONER BRIEF

Group Violence Reduction Strategy: Group Enforcement Actions and Talking Points

Version 1 (Spring 2010)

This memorandum explores the role and purpose of demonstration, and subsequent, group enforcement actions (“crackdowns”) associated with the law enforcement component of the National Network for Safe Communities group violence reduction strategy (also known as “Operation Ceasefire”). The memorandum also includes talking points for presenting these actions within actual Call-Ins/Notification meetings with group and gang members.

I. General Overview: Group Enforcement Actions

In the context of Operation Ceasefire, also known as the National Network for Safe Community gang violence reduction strategy, a group-based enforcement (“crackdown”) can take many forms. Generally, these actions seek to pull “levers,” or bring legal and informal sanctions to bear, against the members of a group or gang that commits a violent act, such as a shooting or a homicide. To be effective, these group enforcement actions must be carefully adapted to the local context and situation. These enforcement actions share several distinct features:

(1) **These actions are group based.** These enforcement actions pursue serious consequences for the “shooter,” the individual who committed the (prohibited) violent act, AND seek to bring some type of legal sanction, informal sanction or *uncomfortable attention* to as many of that individual’s group associates as possible for any crimes they may be committing. The purpose of this group focus is to hold groups and gangs collectively accountable for the violence, and by doing so, to reduce the group dynamic that drives much urban and suburban violence.

(2) **These actions use available legal and informal sanctions creatively.** To be effective, the group enforcement action simply needs to demonstrate that special attention was paid to the entire group associated with the shooter. This often means that the shooter is arrested and detained while his case is pending, and that his associates face whatever sanctions can be brought against them based on their current behavior and legal vulnerabilities. This may include violating those group members under community supervision or simply vigorously enforcing the conditions of their probation or parole; serving outstanding arrest warrants against other group members; performing drug buys and executing drug arrests. This can also include more creative sanctions such as serving

warrants for outstanding child support; checking group and gang members for unregistered cars or performing housing code enforcement where they live. These group enforcement actions should leverage the imagination of the working group to creatively identify and use a combination of sanctions against violent groups.

(3) These actions are performed explicitly in response to “prohibited” violent acts. In Call-ins/Notification meetings, attending group and gang members are told that there are now a new set of rules that will govern law enforcement actions. Business as usual will continue for most types of crime. For crimes of violence (or whatever behavior you are defining as “prohibited”), usually defined as shooting and homicide, there are a new set of rules. When violence is committed, the individuals responsible and the groups they associate with will receive very special attention from a coalition of local, state and federal law enforcement. Group enforcement actions should be clearly communicated to offenders, community members, the media and the public as resulting directly from violent acts committed by group and gang members.

Generally, the first Call-In or Notification in a new jurisdiction should follow an initial group enforcement action. Subsequent Call-Ins should generally follow subsequent enforcement actions to continue to community the partnership’s core messages.

(4) These actions are ideally performed in a coordinated fashion by the local, state and federal law enforcement partnership implementing Ceasefire. This partnership approach allows federally-eligible cases to be quickly reviewed and adopted when appropriate; it allows local law enforcement to work more effectively to ensure speedy disposition of group and gang member cases through understandings with local prosecutors; and allows the partnership to exploit legal vulnerabilities in a manner that is more efficient and effective than each agency operating in its own fashion. See section II (below) for a more detailed discussion of different types and levels of enforcement actions.

II. Group Enforcement Actions “In Practice”

In practice, group enforcement actions are never perfect. Working groups are not always able to prosecute the shooter for the shooting. They cannot always arrest or detain every group member. What is important is that these actions cross a subjective threshold where group members in your community now understand that the “rules are different” and that law enforcement is making a credible statement in the call-in when they state that violence (the prohibited behavior) will bring special attention against entire groups. In practice, group enforcement actions generally fall into the following categories:

- (1) *Quick Enforcement Action:* The Ceasefire working group decides a group has “crossed the line” by committing the prohibited behavior and should become the focus of their special

attention. This working group puts together a plan to respond to this behavior. Generally, they will assess the current legal exposure of group members, identify and pull any legal levers currently available to them. This generally can be performed in three to six weeks, depending on resource and operational constraints. These actions often include violating those group members under community supervision **or** vigorously enforcing the conditions of their probation or parole or enhancing those conditions; serving outstanding arrest warrants against group members; street drug enforcement (performing drug buys and executing drug arrests); review of current cases for state enhancements and/or federal adoption; withdrawal of plea deals from group members; reviewing the sources of bail and bond funds; serving warrants for outstanding child support; checking group and gang members for unregistered cars; performing housing code enforcement where they live. These actions often result in arrest, detention and short term jail sentences as well as some shorter state sentences for group members.

- (2) *Medium-Term Enforcement Action:* In this case, the working group engages in a brisk state-level drug or conspiracy investigation. This often involves medium-term undercover investigations, usually aimed at narcotics sales or trafficking, though it can also involve conspiracy cases, wire-taps and the like. These take longer than quick crackdowns, but can normally be brought home in two to three months. These often result in serious state sentences under gang certification, habitual felon or related statutes. These actions can include federal review and adoption of some cases.
- (3) *Major/Long-Term Enforcement Action:* In this case, there is a federal or joint state-federal long-term drug and RICO conspiracy investigation that results in the wholesale adoption and prosecution of all or most cases in federal court. This type of action generally results in the heaviest sentences, and will generate significant attention from media, the public and offenders, but is rare, resource intensive and very slow.

Notes for Practitioners:

- These are general categories of group enforcement actions—many such actions may fall in between these categories, which are not mutually exclusive.
- All such group enforcement actions can proceed and be effective, without necessarily bringing a formal case against the homicide perpetrator for the homicide or for any crime. Often, these actions can focus on impact players within the shooter's group, and bring available sanctions to bear against these players.
- Group enforcement actions can also involve systematic attention to the social network and hierarchies of groups and gangs to identify impact players and gang leaders. For an award-winning example of this type of investigation performed by the Cincinnati Police Department as part of their implementation of Ceasefire, go to:

http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/npsc/pdfs/CPD_Excellent_in_Criminal_Investigation_Award_FINAL1.pdf.

- It can also be useful in the Call-Ins and through other methods, to communicate enforcement actions that are related to street violence, even if they are not the result of a group enforcement action. For an example of a very effective use of a high profile prosecution in this way in the original Boston project, see Appendix I. In this case, the Cardoza prosecution was used to communicate to groups and gangs in Boston that gang members involved in violence were going to receive very, very special prosecutorial attention.

III. Talking About Group Enforcement Actions In Your Call-In/Notification:

By implementing this gang violence reduction strategy to reduce violence in your community, you are changing the way you do things. Law enforcement will operate differently from now on, particularly in response to violence. Offenders and potential offenders need to know this in order to change their behavior accordingly. The purpose of the Call-In/Notification is to communicate the “new rules of the game” to the group and gang members in your community, as well as to provide an opportunity for the community to tell them the violence is wrong, and to offer help for those who will take it.

Call-Ins/Notification meetings should generally be timed to highlight recent crackdown actions; and to state (or repeat) the services/opportunity and community anti-violence messages. Especially in your initial Call-Ins, the explicit purpose of talking about crackdown actions is **to establish the credibility of group-focused sanctions**. To do this, you should **create a chart or visual display** of the group that was the focus of your first or most recent crackdown. This should include mug shots or other pictures of each group member; if there was a meaningful hierarchy to the group, you may want to arrange the pictures accordingly. It is often useful to list the actual or potential sentences or sanctions that fell on each group member under their picture.

In practice, this often means listing the sentences that different group/gang members **are facing** in jail, state or federal prison. For example, John Smith was sentenced for shooting Albert Jones, he is in jail and is facing 20 years in state prison; Joe Smith was arrested and is in lock-up for being in possession of a firearm, because of his record he is now facing 10 years in federal prison; Alex Johnson’s probation was violated, he is in jail awaiting a revocation hearing that could return him to state prison for 3 years; Richard Williams’ was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant, he is in the county jail awaiting sentencing, etc. A key point to communicate is that “these guys would all be walking around right now, if their boy hadn’t shot someone.”

It is also critical in the Call-In/Notification meetings, **that Law Enforcement practitioners not “overpromise” what they can deliver**. This Call-in is about providing these group/gang members

with accurate, credible information so they can make the right decisions, not threatening them. It is unlikely that the working group can put all the members of any given gang in federal prison, and may not even get them all off of the street at one time. The critical work of the Call-In is to establish that the rules are different and attention will now be given to groups as a result of violence. To be effective, that attention must simply be sufficient for group members to actually believe that things have changed.

Finally, resources and operational capacity allowing, it is important that law enforcement communicate that this special attention will be paid to “the worst group” and “the next group.” In other words, whatever group is the **most** violent at the time of the Call-in, and whichever is the **next** group that shoots somebody after the call in will both receive this special group enforcement attention.

Talking Points: The crackdown should be discussed during the part of the Call-In when the law enforcement portion of the partnership is talking about “the new rules of the game.” Here are some recommendations for how to talk about enforcement actions in your Call-In/Notification meeting:

- “Today is a new day in (your jurisdiction) and we are here to tell you the rules. From now on, when you or anyone commits (the prohibited acts of violence), we will be paying very special attention to entire their entire group.
- All of our local, state and federal partners are on board with this. We have things worked out such that violence is going to bring very swift and certain consequences from now on. (If you can, you should state that you have special understandings with local and federal prosecutors that will limit plea bargaining and provide for enhanced federal review and adoption of cases, etc.).
- We know that the violence is driven by the groups and gangs in (your jurisdiction). From now on, we are going to bring law enforcement consequences accordingly.
- We are going to be paying special attention to the most violent group in (your jurisdiction) at any given time. In addition, the next time there is a shooting or a homicide after this meeting, we will come after that group. In both cases, we will go after the shooter for the shooting, but we will get the entire group for something.
- Up on the wall is (the last group that shot someone, or the worst group in your jurisdiction). If you look at this chart, you will see some familiar faces. This was (group/gang name). They committed the last (prohibited act) in (your jurisdiction). The shooter is now (location/sentence/pending charges); his boys are (list the consequences faced by the

shooters' associates). These guys would all be walking around right now, if their boy hadn't shot someone. This is what we mean. This is how things will be from now on.

- This is not personal, but the violence must stop. We would prefer that you listen to the members of your community who are here today and stop the violence. We would prefer that you take the help being offered by the service providers. But if nothing else, put your guns down.
- Starting as of the end of this meeting, the next person that shoots somebody in (your jurisdiction), this entire law enforcement partnership is coming after him and everyone he runs with. If you want this kind of attention, then let someone you run with shoot somebody—the next time we get together, you and your boys will be up on this wall. Now you know how things are going to work. If you see one of your friends about to involve themselves in violence, tell them to stop.
- Please take this information and use it. Good luck.”

APPENDIX I:

**FREDDIE CARDOZA FLYER
OPERATION CEASEFIRE IN BOSTON**

FREDDIE CARDOZA

**PROBLEM: VIOLENT GANG
MEMBER**

"Given his extensive criminal record,
if there was a federal law against
jaywalking we'd indict him for that."
--Don Stern, US Attorney

**SOLUTION: ARMED CAREER
CRIMINAL CONVICTION**

Arrested with one bullet
Sentence: 19 years, 7 months
No possibility of parole

ADDRESS:

**OTISVILLE FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE
Maximum Security Facility, New York¹**

¹ Kennedy, David M. Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High Crime Settings and a Theory of Prevention. *Valparaiso University Law Review*. Symposium, Juvenile Crime: Policy Proposals on Guns & Violence, Gangs & Drugs. vol. 31, no.2, 1997: 449.

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“CEASEFIRE”: BASIC STEPS TO IMPLEMENTATION

1. Select target offense category (homicide; gun assaults; shots fired) as focus of operation
2. “Group mapping”: identify violent groups
 - Convene experienced front-line officers, field probation/parole, etc
 - Identify, on the basis of their working knowledge, violent groups (gangs, drug crews, small neighborhood sets, etc.)
 - Identify “turf”, areas of operation, etc.
 - Identify current/recent violent activity, beefs, alliances, etc.
 - Estimate number of individuals in each group
 - Institutionalize process so this information is updated regularly
 - **Product: list of violent groups; “network” of beefs and alliances; identification of most serious current and historical groups; estimate of number of individuals involved; routinized production of key strategic and tactical information**
3. “Incident review”: review a number of incidents of the target offense to gather information and insight about the problem
 - Identify the most recent 50-200 target offenses (i.e., homicides). Review all such incidents (do not select by gang connection, omit domestics, etc.)
 - Gather available formal information: location, weapon type, criminal history of victim and offender, probation/parole status, etc.
 - Convene experienced front-line officers, field probation/parole, etc. and review with them what they know about these incidents and those involved: motive and context, relation of victim to an offending group, relation of suspect to an offending group; previous incidents that led up to this one; incidents that followed from this one; etc.
 - **Product: robust description of target problem**

4. Initial “demonstration” crackdown: identify key group for initial enforcement action
 - Select “standout” violent group
 - Identify members, especially “impact players”: usually on the basis of up-to-date front-line information
 - Assess individuals’ legal vulnerabilities: current cases, old cases, warrants, probation/parole status, drug activity, etc.
 - Frame interagency enforcement plan focusing directly on group members.
 - Implement. Ideally, this should result in a high-profile sweep in which arrests, warrant service, violations, etc. all happen more or less at once. This is, of course, not always possible.
 - **Product: “marketable” group crackdown**

5. Identify members of groups and their supervision status: a) or b) below:
 - *a) Identify members of **all** violent groups and establish their probation/parole status*
 - Charge front-line officers, etc. with identifying group members. Review any existing information they may already have (books, lists, etc.)
 - Review existing formal information: case files, field stops, gang databases, etc.
 - If necessary, conduct surveillance, deploy informants, etc.
 - At executive level, review this information for reliability
 - Provide list to probation and parole to identify which group members are currently under supervision
 - Institutionalize process so this information is updated regularly
 - **Product: list of group members (for subsequent group crackdowns) and group members under supervision (for group crackdowns and to implement call-ins)**

 - *b) Identify several probationers/parolees in **each** violent group*
 - Charge front-line officers, probation and parole, etc. with identifying 1-3 members of each group currently under supervision
 - **Product: list of at least several members of each group who are under supervision. This is sufficient for implementing the call-in, but requires additional information gathering if a group becomes subject to a crackdown.**

6. Organize social services
 - Identify social service providers who can provide assistance to group members: education, employment, emergency assistance, treatment, mentoring, casework, etc.
 - Obtain commitment to give rapid, priority attention to group members as part of overall operation

- Create “one stop” entryway for group members. Group members should only have to make one call for help, and should then be personally assessed and assisted in obtaining any necessary services
 - **Product: service structure for those who want out**
7. Organize community “moral voices”
- Identify community figures willing to articulate key community standards
 - The violence is wrong
 - There is no excuse
 - You’re doing enormous damage to yourselves, your families, your communities
 - You’re better than this
 - We care about you, need you, and want to help you
 - Challenge the street code: it’s not OK to go to prison, it’s not OK to die, it’s not OK to hurt someone, your boys won’t have your back, etc.
 - Community elders, family members, mothers of murdered children, mothers whose sons have gone to prison, “old head” ex-offenders, faith leaders, etc.
 - **Product: community voices to articulate community standards and undercut the street code**
8. Organize first offender call-in
- Organize enforcement agencies who will deliver “stop it” message
 - Organize service providers, or a service broker, who can deliver services
 - Organize community voices
 - If working with bench and using courtroom as call-in site, each out to bench, explain project, find courtroom for event, find judge willing to preside over initial phase of event (bringing in offenders and acting on no-shows)
 - If not working with bench/using courtroom, determine site for call-in
 - Rehearse meeting with speakers
 - **Product: participants, script, site, presiding judge**
9. Identify groups which should be represented at first call-in
- This could be all groups. If there are too many to manage at one call-in (maximum number of attendants is about forty), identify most important groups, on basis of recent and historical violence, or schedule multiple call-ins
 - **Product: groups for first call-in**
10. Identify “representatives” from each group and serve them with notices to appear (notices should go out about a week before call-in)
- Identify one-two individuals from each group who are under supervision
 - Probation/parole gives them notice to appear at call-in

- This can be done in ordinary fashion through probation/parole officers, or by hand-service in the field (for example, home visits by teams of probation/parole and police officers). The latter makes a statement and is more desirable, but is more work.
- **Product: members of target groups notified to attend call-in**

11. Conduct call-in (should be scheduled within week or so of sweep or other action resulting initial crackdown)

- Messages:
 - This is nothing personal; you are here as a messenger to your group; take what you here back to the whole group
 - Enforcement agencies: explain crackdown – target behavior (homicide, shooting, assaults) will now result in enforcement action **to entire group**. It may be necessary to fine-tune this message to respect the actual volume of target events and the capacity of law enforcement: for example, delivering message that *the first homicide* after the call-in will result in a group crackdown.
 - Community members: violence is unacceptable
 - Service providers: help is available
 - All: we'll help you if you'll let us, we'll stop you if you make us

12. Repeat as necessary.

- Carry out enforcement promise. Act, for example, against first group to commit a homicide
- Carry out service promise for those who seek help
- Repeat call-in after first group crackdown is carried out.
 - Deliver clear explanation: we told you what we were going to do, this group member killed someone, we took the following special actions with respect to his entire group, we will continue to do this as you make us
 - Some of you have asked for help and have gotten it
 - Reinforce community message
- Repeat as necessary as violent groups are attended to, to reinforce availability of services, and to reinforce community message