WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE:

OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL RESEARCH EVIDENCE AND BEST PRACTICE

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GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

1. Present what works in reducing gun violence on a community level – from national research and our experience

2. Illustrate these principles and practices at work in the Oakland Ceasefire story

3. Learn more about Portland’s work and context

4. Q&A and Discussion
1. Gun violence is the most serious public safety problem that cities face.

2. It creates irreversible harm, is incredibly expensive and drives our criminal justice and community safety practice and policy.

3. Gun violence is a problem that we can do something about in the near-term. This requires a focus on those at highest risk of violence now.

4. Our goal for this presentation is to review “key ingredients” that are the most important in reducing gun violence.
RESEARCH:
The Impact of Various Strategies on Community Violence
Strategy: Why Research Matters (1)

• Rigorous research is really the combination of the experience of communities and good social science.

• If we really care about making progress on a problem, we have to understand the research.

• What is the problem actually? What have people tried? What has worked and what hasn’t? What questions remain?
We work primarily from the “focused deterrence” / Group Violence Reduction framework, for several reasons:

- A large body of research evidence supports its effectiveness in reducing violence. (25 evaluations, 2 meta-reviews).

- It has been repeatedly shown to reduce community violence and individual recidivism in variety of different cities.

- It’s an effective way to mobilize police, justice system, community and social service actors to work together to reduce gun violence in the near-term.

*Note:* Timeline and likely impact of gang prevention versus violence reduction/intervention.
Systematic Review of Focused Deterrence
Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018), Criminology and Public Policy

- Review identified 24 rigorous evaluations with control groups

- Group Violence Reduction Strategies were associated with largest crime reductions.
Summary of the Literature on Gang Prevention (from OJJDP):

- Howell’s (1998) review of the literature reveals that “nothing has been demonstrated through rigorous evaluation to be effective in preventing or reducing serious and violent gang delinquency.”

- Spergel’s (1995) independent review: “[T]raditional social intervention programs, ….have shown little effect or may even have worsened the youth gang problem.”

- GREAT: shows no significant differences between treatment group and control group on any of the general delinquency or violent offending outcomes.

- Little Village evaluation* (2003) appeared to reduce arrests for violence and drug crimes but not for property crimes or total arrests and showed increases in the neighborhood’s overall levels of gang violence.
Outreach and Support: Related Research

There is not established best practice for highest risk of violence clients. Yet, the research does offer some guidance.

1. Increasing Safety and Reducing Recidivism:
   - Evaluations of street outreach have mixed results for individual and community outcomes. (Cure Violence, Boston Safe Streets, Little Village, prior evals 1960s)
   - Direct communication (Ceasefire) has been shown to significantly reduce general and violent recidivism (Chicago PSN, Boston BRI)
   - Interventions focused on improved decision making (CBT) – when done well -- show significant impacts on subsequent recidivism.

2. Accessing Opportunity:
   - Evaluations of “traditional” reentry programs find minimal impact on employment or CJ outcomes for CJ-involved population (CEO, Ready for Work, Safer Return, Project Greenlight, MDRC Rev., etc.).
Social Networks Bring Risk

Research is increasingly clear that the concentration of violence within social networks is a key factor in addressing gun violence.

• The risk of future gun shot victimization is highly influenced by the composition of an individuals’ social network.

• The more people someone is connected to who are victims or perpetrators of shootings, the higher their risk.

• The average time to a retaliation shooting once someone is “infected” is about 125 days.

Violence prevention efforts that account for social contagion (risk as a feature of networks), will be better able to prevent more shootings than efforts that focus on only demographics.
Violence Reduction Best Practice: What Matters

- Generating political will and leadership to reduce violence
- Using an evidence-based strategy
- Understanding the problem of violence and focusing on those at very highest risk of violence now
- Building devoted infrastructure to reduce violence in the near term
- Managing to violence reduction outcomes across partners
- Coordination and trust between police, intervention and community members at the very highest risk of violence.
OAKLAND CASE STUDY
Oakland Ceasefire

GOALS

Reduce shootings and homicides

Decrease recidivism/arrests and improve outcomes for those at highest risk of violence

Strengthen police-community relations and trust
Problem Analysis Insights: Understanding the Problem

What the public and policy makers thought: Violence primarily driven by juveniles, drugs and economic motives.

What the analysis revealed:
• Homicide primarily driven by specific running group/gang conflicts and personal disputes between group members.
• Those at very highest risk primarily group-involved adult men of color (the average age is 30)
• With heavy justice system involvement (averaging 12 prior arrests at the time of homicide, 7 for felonies) and social connections to actively violent street groups
• Only 10% of homicide involved juveniles, only 13% of homicides had any connection to drugs.
Focus on the Very High Risk Individuals

Oakland's Population

Criminal Justice Population

Very High Risk Population

- 400,000 people
- 20,000 people
- 250-350 people
Focusing on Very High Risk Individuals Now

- 18-35 year old males
- Significant Criminal Justice involvement
- Associated with an active crew/gang/group
- Has been shot before
- Has a close friend or family member shot in last 12 months
Understanding the Problem: Central and East Oakland Groups, Primarily Black

Associations change frequently
Oakland Ceasefire Performance Management: Overview

1. Shooting Reviews – identify VHR people, hottest conflicts, intervention and enforcement priorities.

2. Coordination Meetings – Oakland Unite, OPD, community partners develop near term strategy for these particular people and conflicts – mobilizes life coaches, outreach, crisis response staff and contractors

3. Performance Review Meetings – Partners review citywide shootings trends; direct communication; service uptake and caseload; relative to annual and two-month benchmarks
Community of Support for Very High Risk Individuals

- Intensive Case Management/Life Coaching (14 Life Coaches)
- Clients eligible to receive incentivized stipends
- Improved coordination between Life Coaches and Employment Support Services
- Relocation Support
- CBT Groups
- **Faith Partners:** Weekly Night Walks, Holiday Support, Political Support
OAKLAND

Gun Violence Reduction Strategy

Focused Enforcement on those who continue to engage in gun violence
Trust Building and Procedural Justice

- PJ Training for OPD in partnership with community (best practice in state/nation)
- Focus Groups with VHR clients
- Leadership Council
- Shooting Scene Re-design
- Advanced PJ/CF training for CRTs
- Implicit Bias work
Shrinking OPD Footprint

![Graph showing the shrinking OPD footprint from 2009 to 2015. The graph indicates a decrease in figures over the years, with specific data points for various years.](image-url)
Improved OPD Outcomes

Over the past six years

- Clearance Rate Increased
  - From 29% to 71%

- Complaints
  - Down 55%

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IMPACT ON GUN VIOLENCE
CEASEFIRE Strategy
Progress in Oakland 2012-2018

*Ceasefire Partnership began on October 18, 2012

-49% REDUCTION
Effectively Reducing Violence Requires Big System Changes

Each major component demands a complementary culture change:

1. Deciding what crime(s) you are actually trying to reduce
2. Using data to identify the VHR population across multiple stakeholders.
3. Directly communicating with those at highest risk, and incorporating the principles of procedural justice into this communication.
4. Shifting focus to harm reduction as opposed to conventional service provision, job training, gang prevention etc.
5. Intelligence-based, targeted enforcement to diffuse violence conflicts, informed by the principles of procedural justice.
6. Partners holding each other mutually accountable for quality implementation and outcomes through the use of performance measures.
APPENDIX: OAKLAND IMPACT EVALUATION
Oakland Ceasefire Evaluation

Collaboration between Northeastern University (Braga, Greg Zimmerman), Northwestern University (Andrew Papachristos), and Rutgers University (Brunson)

4 Key Components / Goals:

- **Place-Based Impact Assessment** (COMPLETED)
  - Was Oakland Ceasefire associated with citywide reductions?
  - Did Oakland neighborhoods where Ceasefire was implemented experience reductions?

- **Gang / Group Impact Assessment** (COMPLETED)
  - Did Ceasefire reduce the shooting behaviors of Oakland gangs/groups?

- **Individual Impact Assessment** (IN PROCESS)
  - Did Ceasefire reduce recidivism by participants?
  - Did Ceasefire reduce violent victimization of participants?

- **Community / Service Partner Agencies Perceptions** (COMPLETED)
  - Did Ceasefire improve neighborhood safety?
  - Did Ceasefire improve community-police trust?

Evaluation was focused on gun homicides and non-fatal shootings

- Total homicides and non-fatal shootings also analyzed in place-based impact assessment
MONTHLY COUNTS OF GUN HOMICIDES IN OAKLAND, 2010 - 2017

Ceasefire Implementation

CROSS-CITY RESULTS

Estimated 31.5% reduction controlling for other trends and seasonal variations ($p < .05$).

Only 2 of 12 comparison cities experienced significant reductions during this time period (Stockton, San Francisco).

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Monthly Counts of Shootings in Matched Treated and Untreated Block Groups in Oakland, 2010 - 2017

WITHIN OAKLAND RESULTS

Estimated 20.0% reduction in shootings in treated BGs relative to comparison BGs ($p<.05$).

Non-significant 18.0% reduction in shootings in areas surrounding treated BGs relative to areas surrounding untreated block groups.
GMI V. NON-GMI TRENDS

GMI shootings decreased by 43.2% while non-GMI shootings decreased by only 23.2%.

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Estimated 27.0% reduction in shootings by treated gangs relative to untreated gangs \((p<.05)\).

Estimated 26.0% reduction in shootings by vicariously-treated gangs relative to untreated gangs \((p<.05)\).
Oakland’s Challenging History of Violence

1. Oakland’s problem with violence has stubbornly resisted the national downtrend (prior to 2013).

2. Since 1985, Oakland’s murder rate is 4-6 times the national rate. Top 10 most dangerous cities in the country and the most dangerous in California.

3. From 2005-2012, despite a large local investment in violence prevention services and police resources (Measure Y), murders in Oakland increased by 37% while the national rate went down by -16%.

4. Prior to 2012, over the past 40+ years, Oakland has only had one period with consecutive years of fewer than 90 homicides.

5. Like many Bay Area cities, Oakland is undergoing rapid demographic, economic and community changes.
Murder Rate per 100,000: Oakland v. California

![Graph showing the murder rate per 100,000 for Oakland, California, and the United States from 2003 to 2012. The graph indicates a peak in the Oakland murder rate in 2006, with subsequent fluctuations.]
Understanding the Problem: Homicides & Firearm Assaults* 2016

[Map of areas with hotspots for homicides and firearm assaults]

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52.1% reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings between 2011 and 2017.
In Chicago, the impact of direct communication (forums) on violence was by far the most powerful part of the strategy.