

### CALIFORNIA PARTNERSHIP FOR SAFECOMMUNITIES

# WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE:

# OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL RESEARCH EVIDENCE AND BEST PRACTICE

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#### **GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

- 1. Present what works in reducing <u>gun violence</u> on a community level from national research and our experience
- 2. Illustrate these principles and practices at work in the Oakland Ceasefire story
- 3. Learn more about Portland's work and context
- 4. Q&A and Discussion

#### **IMPORTANT FRAMING**

- 1. Gun violence is the most serious public safety problem that cities face.
- 2. It creates irreversible harm, is incredibly expensive and drives our criminal justice and community safety practice and policy.
- 3. Gun violence is a problem that we can do something about in the near-term. This requires a focus on those at highest risk of violence now.
- 4. Our goal for this presentation is to review "key ingredients" that are the most important in reducing gun violence



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# RESEARCH: The Impact of Various Strategies on Community Violence

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#### Strategy: Why Research Matters (1)

- Rigorous research is really the combination of the experience of communities and good social science.
- If we really care about making progress on a problem, we have to understand the research.
- What is the problem actually? What have people tried?
   What has worked and what hasn't? What questions remain?

#### Overall Strategy: Research Matters (2)

We work primarily from the "focused deterrence" / Group Violence Reduction framework, for several reasons:

- A large body of research evidence supports it's effectiveness in reducing violence. (25 evaluations, 2 meta-reviews).
- It has been repeatedly shown to reduce community violence and individual recidivism in variety of different cities.
- It's an effective way to mobilize police, justice system, community and social service actors to work together to reduce gun violence in the near-term.
- Note: Timeline and likely impact of gang prevention versus violence reduction/intervention.

### Systematic Review of Focused Deterrence

Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018), Criminology and Public Policy

- Review identified 24 rigorous evaluations with control groups
- Group Violence
   Reduction Strategies
   were associated with
   largest crime
   reductions.

#### **Mean Effect Sizes for Study Outcomes**

Studyname	Outcome	Statistics for each study			Std diff in means and 95% CI				
		Std diff S in means	Standard error	p-Value					
Lovell PSN	Gun assaults	1.186	0.207	0.000					-
hdanapdis VRS	Total homicides	1.039	0.283	0.000				-	=
NH Langevity	Carrbined	0.936	0.324	0.004			(i)	-	-
Nashville <b>DM</b>	Carrbined	0.838	0.320	0.009			1	-	
Stockton, CA	<b>Gunhamidides</b>	0.763	0.157	0.000					
Rochester Ceasefire	Carrbined	0.675	0.298	0.023			1:		
NOLAGARS	Carrbined	0.656	0.283	0.020			) <del>,</del>	-	
Boston Ceasefire I	Combined	0.645	0.241	0.008			8	-	
KC NoVA	Carrbined	0.607	0.322	0.060			-	-	
LA Cessefire	Carrbined	0.565	0.351	0.108			*	-	
Rockford DM	Carrbined	0.521	0.285	0.067			<u> </u>	■	
Boston Ceasefire II	Carrbined	0.503	0.068	0.000			1		
Chicago G/RS	Total gang shootings	0.414	0.157	0.008			5 m	⊢	
Cincinnati IRV	GM harricides	0.352	0.224	0.115					
GasgowCIRV	Carrbined	0.298	0.133	0.025			-		
G.rtersville DM	Carrbined	0.248	0.225	0.272			+=		
High Part DMI	Carrbined	0.243	0.126	0.054			-	<del>-</del> %	
Newark Cessefire	Gun shot wounds	0.225	0.160	0.159			-	-	
Chicago PSN	Carrbined	0.181	0.061	0.003					
Roande DMI	Carrbined	0.079	0.082	0.331			-		
Seattle DMI	All crime	0.074	0.035	0.032					
Pecria DMI	Carrbined	0.037	0.300	0.901		-		-3	
Ozala DMI	All crime	-0.001	0.055	0.985			-		
Montgomery DMI	All arime	-0.051	0.116	0.661			-		
1970 15		0.383	0.061	0.000	l,			<b>)</b>	I
					-2.00	-1.00	0.00	1.00	2.00
					Fa	Favors Control Favors Treatment			



Random Effects Model, Q=122.568, df = 23, p<0.000

Combined Mean ES = .383

**GVRS Mean ES** = .657

# Summary of the Literature on Gang Prevention (from OJJDP):

- Howell's (1998) review of the literature reveals that "nothing has been demonstrated through rigorous evaluation to be effective in preventing or reducing serious and violent gang delinquency."
- Spergel's (1995) independent review: "[T]raditional social intervention programs, ....have shown little effect or may even have worsened the youth gang problem."
- GREAT: shows no significant differences between treatment group and control group on any of the general delinquency or violent offending outcomes.
- Little Village evaluation\* (2003) appeared to reduce arrests for violence and drug crimes but not for property crimes or total arrests and showed increases in the neighborhood's overall levels of gang violence.

#### Outreach and Support: Related Research

There is not established best practice for highest risk of violence clients. Yet, the research does offer some guidance.

#### 1. Increasing Safety and Reducing Recidivism:

- Evaluations of street outreach have mixed results for individual and community outcomes. (Cure Violence, Boston Safe Streets, Little Village, prior evals 1960s)
- Direct communication (Ceasefire) has been shown to significantly reduce general and violent recidivism (Chicago PSN, Boston BRI)
- Interventions focused on improved decision making (CBT) when done well -- show <u>significant impacts</u> on subsequent recidivism.

#### 2. Accessing Opportunity:

 Evaluations of "traditional" reentry programs find minimal impact on employment or CJ outcomes for CJ-involved population (CEO, Ready for Work, Safer Return, Project Greenlight, MDRC Rev., etc.).

#### **Social Networks Bring Risk**

Research is increasingly clear that the concentration of violence within social networks is a key factor in addressing gun violence.

- The risk of future gun shot victimization is highly influenced by the composition of an individuals' social network.
- The more people someone is connected to who are victims or perpetrators of shootings, the higher their risk.
- The average time to a retaliation shooting once someone is "infected" is about 125 days.

Violence prevention efforts that account for social contagion (risk as a feature of networks), will be better able to prevent more shootings than efforts that focus on only demographics.

# Violence Reduction Best Practice: What Matters

- Generating political will and leadership to reduce violence
- Using an evidence-based strategy
- Understanding the problem of violence and focusing on those at very highest risk of violence now
- Building devoted infrastructure to reduce violence in the near term
- Managing to violence reduction outcomes across partners
- Coordination and trust between police, intervention and community members at the very highest risk of violence.



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#### OAKLAND CASE STUDY

### Oakland Ceasefire GOALS



\* Reduce shootings and homicides



Decrease recidivism/arrests and improve outcomes for those at highest risk of violence



Strengthen police-community relations and trust



### PARTNERSHIPS











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


# Problem Analysis Insights: Understanding the Problem

What the public and policy makers thought: Violence primarily driven by juveniles, drugs and economic motives.

#### What the analysis revealed:

- Homicide primarily driven by specific running group/gang conflicts and personal disputes between group members.
- Those at very highest risk primarily group-involved <u>adult</u> men of color (the average age is 30)
- With heavy justice system involvement (averaging 12 prior arrests at the time of homicide, 7 for felonies) and social connections to actively violent street groups
- Only 10% of homicide involved juveniles, only 13% of homicides had any connection to drugs.




# Focusing on Very High Riskviduals Now

- 18-35 year old males
- Significant Criminal Justice involvement
- Associated with an active crew/gang/group
- Has been shot before
- Has a close friend or family member shot in last 12 months





Understanding the Problem: Central and East Oakland Groups, Primarily Black



# Oakland Ceasefire Performance Management: Overview

1. Shooting Reviews – identify VHR people, hottest conflicts, intervention and enforcement priorities.



2. Coordination Meetings – Oakland Unite, OPD, community partners develop near term strategy for these particular people and conflicts – mobilizes life coaches, outreach, crisis response staff and contractors



3. Performance Review Meetings – Partners review citywide shootings trends; direct communication; service uptake and caseload; relative to annual and two-month benchmarks

# Community of Support for Very High Risk Individuals



- Intensive Case Management/Life Coaching (14 Life Coaches)
- Clients eligible to receive incentivized stipends
- Improved coordination between Life Coaches and Employment Support Services
- Relocation Support
- CBT Groups
- <u>Faith Partners</u>: Weekly Night Walks, Holiday Support, Political Support




# Trust Building and Procedural





- PJ Training for OPD in partnership with community (best practice in state/nation)
- Focus Groups with VHR clients
- Leadership Council
- Shooting Scene Re-design
- Advanced PJ/CF training for CRTs
- Implicit Bias work

#### **Shrinking OPD Footprint**



### Improved OPD Outcomes



Over the past six years

Clearance Rate Increased

From 29% to 71%

Complaints

Down **55%** 


Over the past six years www.theCApartnership.org



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#### IMPACT ON GUN VIOLENCE

# CEASEFIRE Strategy Progress in Oakland 2012-2018



### Effectively Reducing Violence Requires Big System Changes

Each major component demands a complementary culture change:

- 1. Deciding what crime(s) you are actually trying to reduce
- 2. Using <u>data</u> to identify the VHR population across multiple stakeholders.
- 3. <u>Directly communicating</u> with <u>those at highest risk</u>, and incorporating the principles of procedural justice into this communication.
- 4. Shifting focus to <u>harm reduction</u> as opposed to conventional service provision, job training, gang prevention etc.
- 5. Intelligence-based, targeted <u>enforcement to diffuse violence conflicts</u>, informed by the principles of procedural justice.
- 6. Partners holding each other mutually accountable for quality implementation <u>and outcomes</u> through the use of performance measures.



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# APPENDIX: OAKLAND IMPACT EVALUATION

#### **Oakland Ceasefire Evaluation**

Collaboration between Northeastern University (Braga, Greg Zimmerman), Northwestern University (Andrew Papachristos), and Rutgers University (Brunson)

#### 4 Key Components / Goals:

Place-Based Impact Assessment

- (COMPLETED)
- Was Oakland Ceasefire associated with citywide reductions?
- Did Oakland neighborhoods where Ceasefire was implemented experience reductions?
- Gang / Group Impact Assessment

(COMPLETED)

- Did Ceasefire reduce the shooting behaviors of Oakland gangs /groups?
- Individual Impact Assessment

(IN PROCESS)


- Did Ceasefire reduce recidivism by participants?
- Did Ceasefire reduce violent victimization of participants?
- Community / Service Partner Agencies Perceptions

(COMPLETED)

- Did Ceasefire improve neighborhood safety?
- Did Ceasefire improve community-police trust?

#### Evaluation was focused on gun homicides and non-fatal shootings

Total homicides and non-fatal shootings also analyzed in place-based impact assessment




#### CROSS-CITY RESULTS

Estimated
31.5%
reduction
controlling for
other trends
and seasonal
variations
(p<.05).

Only 2 of 12 comparison cities experienced significant reductions during this time period (Stockton, San Francisco).

Monthly Counts of Shootings in Matched Treated and Untreated Block

Groups in Oakland, 2010 - 2017



#### <u>WITHIN</u> <u>OAKLAND</u> <u>RESULTS</u>

Estimated 20.0% reduction in shootings in treated BGs relative to comparison BGs (*p*<.05).

Non-significant 18.0% reduction in shootings in areas surrounding treated BGs relative to areas surrounding untreated block groups.



#### GMI V. NON-GMI TRENDS

GMI shootings decreased by 43.2% while non-GMI shootings decreased by only 23.2%.

### QUASI-EXPERIMENT AL RESULTS


Estimated 27.0% reduction in shootings by treated gangs relative to untreated gangs (*p*<.05).

Estimated 26.0% reduction in shootings by vicariously-treated gangs relative to untreated gangs (*p*<.05).


#### Oakland's Challenging History of Violence


- 1. Oakland's problem with violence has stubbornly resisted the national downtrend (prior to 2013).
- 2. Since 1985, Oakland's murder rate is 4-6 times the national rate. Top 10 most dangerous cities in the country and the most dangerous in California.
- 3. From 2005-2012, despite a large local investment in violence prevention services and police resources (Measure Y), murders in Oakland increased by 37% while the national rate went down by -16%.
- 4. Prior to 2012, over the past 40+ years, Oakland has only had one period with consecutive years of fewer than 90 homicides.
- 5. Like many Bay Area cities, Oakland is undergoing rapid demographic, economic and community changes

### Murder Rate per 100,000: Oakland v.



# Understanding the Problem: Homicides & Firearm Assaults\* 2016






52.1% reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings between 2011 and 2017.

## Direct Communication: A Procedural Justice Alternative to Enforcement

Percentage decrease in Log (Homicide Rate) associated with a one-unit increase in PSN "treatment"



In Chicago, the impact of direct communication (forums) on violence was by far the most powerful part of the strategy.